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Abstract 
 
 
This paper explores the question of whether the institution of the stock market is 
likely to be helpful to developing countries in promoting their real economy and 
ensuring fast industrial growth. The case for and against the stock market inevitably 
involves a discussion of the important related subjects of corporate finance and 
corporate governance. Contrary to the literature the paper arrives at a negative overall 
assessment of the institution of the stock market in relation to economic development. 
It also contributes by its policy proposals concerning the markets for corporate 
control, which again are in conflict with much of the conventional wisdom on the 
subject. 
 
JEL Keywords: Stock market; Market for corporate control; Corporate finance; 
Corporate governance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the question to what extent, if any, the institution of the stock 
market is likely to benefit the real economy in developing countries and aid their 
industrialisation.  This question is examined here by focussing on the following 
aspects which are salient to the assessment of the stock market from a developmental 
perspective: 
(a) the role of the stock market in promoting technological development; 
(b) the implications of the stock market for corporate finance and corporate 
governance; and 
(c) the efficiency of the pricing process and the takeover mechanism observed 
in the real world stock markets. 
 
Contrary to most literature, the present paper contributes by its negative overall 
assessment of the institution of the stock market in relation to economic development.  
 
Although orthodox economics extols the virtues of the stock market and the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) encourage developing countries (DCs) to 
establish or to expand such markets there is an important literature which suggests 
that this institutional innovation may not be helpful for economic development in 
many poor countries. Following the Great Depression and noting the role of the stock 
market in propagating rather than preventing it, John Maynard Keynes (1936) 
famously provided an intellectually robust attack on the institution. He termed the 
stock market a gambling house and suggested that a society’s investment decisions 
should not be left to the vagaries of a casino. The Keynesian criticisms were echoed 
sixty years later in a blue ribbon report by twenty-five leading US finance specialists 
under the Chairmanship of Professor Michael Porter of Harvard University. The 
Commission was appointed in order to find out to what extent, if any, the stock 
market based US financial system was responsible for poor US economic 
performance relative to European countries during 1980-1995. Porter (1992) 
summarized the Commission’s conclusions as follows: 
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 “The change in nature of competition and the increasing pressure of globalisation 
make investment the most critical determinant of competitive advantage. Yet the US 
system of allocating investment capital both within and across companies is failing. 
This puts America at a serious disadvantage in global competition and ultimately 
threatens the long term growth of the US economy”  
 
As with all strong statements in economics this powerful critique of the stock market 
did not stand the test of time. The significance of this criticism came in part from the 
fact that it emanated from a country that was a citadel of the stock market itself. Over 
the next ten years, 1995-2005, the US economic performance improved immeasurably 
and the country experienced spectacular expansion, outdoing its industrial competitors 
in GDP and productivity growth. It is suggested that it is the stock market that has 
enabled the US to adopt information technology and achieve other technological 
breakthroughs much more quickly than other advanced countries (ACs) [see further 
Summers (1999) and Feldstein (1999)]. If the stock market can help with achieving 
similar technical progress in DCs, this would be an important argument for its 
encouragement in such countries.  
 
 
II. The Stock Market: new technology and short-termism 
 
Notwithstanding Keynes, a surprisingly large constituency favours the establishment 
of the stock markets to promote economic development in emerging economies. As 
mentioned above, the IMF and the World Bank have, of course, fully supported the 
institution of the stock market and helped developing countries in various ways to 
either establish them or to encourage their growth (Singh, 1993, Sudweeks, 1990). 
This constituency includes not only the IFIs but also Central Left think tanks such as 
the World Institute of Development Economics Research (WIDER) and surprisingly 
the Chinese Communist party, which has established stock markets in seven Chinese 
cities. 1  
 
                                                 
1 For a detailed analysis of reasons for favouring the stock market by these diverse institutions, see 
Singh and Weiss (1998?). 
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Significant intellectual support for the ability of the stock market to promote technical 
change has come from Professor Larry Summers, an erstwhile critic, who has now 
become a firm supporter of the market. He argued that the US stock market was, in 
large measure, responsible for the structural change experienced in the US economy 
in the 1990s. This had enabled it to recover from low productivity growth of the 
period 1980 to 1995, and achieve higher productivity growth between 1995 and 2005. 
This transformation, according to Summers, was brought about by the take-over 
mechanism on the stock market, which led to a huge reallocation of resources in the 
US economy leading to faster productivity growth. Similarly, Summers suggested that 
through the system of stock options the US stock market is better able to align the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders (Summers, 1999). It was also pointed 
out that the US stock market promotes technological progress through the venture 
capital route. Through the latter, it ensures that the US is able to provide much greater 
incentives for technological innovation than the institutional arrangements in other 
countries. One reason for the higher pay-off for inventors and innovators in the 
Anglo-Saxon system is precisely the exit mechanism through take-overs, which the 
US system allows, normally permitting the target company to be sold on the stock 
market with a sizable capital gain. It has been noted that other countries such as 
Germany, which have tried to emulate the US system in this respect, have not 
succeeded because traditional attitudes to involuntary take-overs still prevail (Black 
and Gilson, 1998). 
 
On the critical side, however, there still persist the arguments of Michael Porter and 
his colleagues regarding the shortcomings of the US financial system, and these 
remain unanswered. Specifically, the critics suggest that the stock market engenders 
short-termism and quick financial gains rather than long-term investment. The short 
time horizon is thought to be inimical both to competitiveness and fostering economic 
development. The bursting of the technology share prices bubble in 2000 – the so-
called “dot com boom and bust” – has provided further support for the critics of the 
stock market.  
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III Stock markets and economic development  
 
Apart from the issue of encouraging technological development by the stock market, 
there are other ways in which the market can contribute to development through a 
variety of channels.  It could raise savings and investment by making it possible for 
individuals and households to purchase a fraction of a shipyard or a steel mill, thereby 
spreading the risk, without which such investment may not occur at all. Similarly the 
monitoring function performed automatically and from the perspective of an 
entrepreneur, costlessly, by the stock market also helps raise investment.  Moreover, a 
well-functioning stock market purportedly allocates resources more efficiently 
through its normal pricing process, which would accord, other things being equal, 
higher share prices to efficient firms and lower prices to inefficient ones. Furthermore, 
the take-over mechanism ostensibly ensures that not just the new investment 
resources but also the existing capital stock is efficiently utilised.  Inefficient use of 
existing resources is punished by the market for corporate control through disciplinary 
takeovers. 
 
How effectively the stock market can perform the above tasks depends on the 
efficiency of two critical market mechanisms, namely (a) the pricing mechanism and 
(b) the take-over mechanism. These are central issues of debate on which the 
literature is briefly reviewed below. 
 
Determination of share prices3
The orthodox paradigm of share price determination postulates that share prices are 
efficient because they emanate from perfect markets involving large numbers of well-
informed buyers and sellers in which no one buyer or seller can influence the price 
and where there is a homogeneous product, namely shares. There is, however, an 
alternative paradigm indicated by Keynes’ comment characterizing stock markets 
essentially as gambling casinos dominated by speculators. Stiglitz (1994); Allen and 
Gale (2000); Shiller, (2000), Shleifer (2000), Baker  and Wurgler (2007), Hong and 
Stein (2007) and not least students of behavioural finance (see for example Barberis 
                                                 
 
3 This section  and the next  rely heavily on and updates the discussion of Singh, Singh and Weiss 
(2003) and Singh (2005). 
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and Thaler, 2003, Hong et al (2007) and Baker et al (2007), formalize the various 
elements of this paradigm. In brief, this literature suggests that, in the face of a highly 
uncertain future, share prices are likely to be influenced by the so-called “noise 
traders”, and by whims, fads and contagion. For similar reasons of psychology, 
investors may attribute much greater weight to near-term price forecasts rather than 
historical long-term performance. This line of reasoning is taken further in the 
growing literature on behavioural finance (referred to above). 
 
Until recently, the empirical literature on share prices has been dominated by the so-
called ‘efficient markets hypothesis’ (EMH), which argues that real world share prices 
are efficient in the sense that they incorporate all available information (Fama, 1970). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, with (a) the 1987 US stock market crash, (b) the meltdown in 
the Asian stock markets in the 1990s and (c) the bursting of the technology stocks 
bubble in 2000, the EMH has suffered fundamental setbacks. Alan Greenspan (1998) 
has commented as follows on the reasons for (a) and (b): “At one point the economic 
system appears stable, the next it behaves as though a dam has reached a breaking 
point, and water (read, confidence) evacuates the reservoir. The United States 
experienced such a sudden change with the decline in stock prices of more than 20 
percent on October 19, 1987. There is no credible scenario that can readily explain so 
abrupt a change in the fundamentals of long-term valuations on that one day. ”  
 
Kindleberger (1989) similarly documented about thirty cases of unwarranted euphoria 
and excessive pessimism on the stock markets since the South-Sea bubble of 1720. He 
termed these episodes as manias, panics and crashes.  
 
Tobin (1984) made an analytically useful distinction  between two kinds of efficiency 
of stock markets, (a) the information arbitrage efficiency that ensures that all 
information concerning a firm’s shares immediately percolates to all stock market 
participants, ensuring that no participant can make a profit on such public 
information; (b) fundamental valuation efficiency, that is, share prices accurately 
reflect a firm’s fundamentals, namely the long-term expected profitability. The 
growing consensus view is that, in these terms, stock markets may at best be regarded 
as being efficient in the sense of (a) but far from being efficient in the economically 
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more important sense (b). Thus EMH, as identified in a, is compatible with share 
prices not reflecting fundamental values.   
 
 
A detailed discussion as well as examples of share prices evidently departing from 
their fundamentals are provided in Singh et al 2005. It is generally accepted that such 
mis-pricing of shares is a common occurrence on the stock market and it may persist 
for a considerable period, some would say for as much as 10 –20 years.  The Nikkei 
stock market index in Japan reached a value of approximately 38000 in the mid-
1980s. Twenty-five years later, it has not recovered to even half the 1980s value. 
Evidence suggests a share price bubble on the Tokyo stock market in the mid-1980s. 
Similarly, UK and US stock markets did not recover to their pre-great depression 
index values until the mid-50s.   
 
IV  The take-over mechanism and the market for corporate control 
 
In orthodox economics, the market for corporate control is thought to be the 
evolutionary endpoint of stock market development. The market may advance 
economic efficiency through two distinct channels, a) the threat of take-overs, which 
can discipline inefficient firms and b) even if the firms were operating efficiently the 
actual take-overs may lead to a restructuring of an economy’s resources leading to 
enhanced social values. Research over the last two decades has indicated that there are 
significant theoretical and practical reasons why the market for corporate control may 
not work in the idealised way outlined above. This research has been discussed in 
detail in Singh (2008) and will not be reviewed here for reasons of space. 
 
This helps to explain that although there exists a very active market for corporate 
control in the major Anglo-Saxon countries, it is seriously inefficient. Two kinds of 
evidence support this conclusion. First, studies of the take-over selection process 
indicate that selection in the market for corporate control takes place only to a limited 
extent on the basis of the target firm’s performance and much more so on the basis of 
its size. A large relatively unprofitable firm has a much smaller chance of being 
acquired than a small profitable firm. Secondly, controlling for other relevant 
variables, studies of post-merger profitability of amalgamating firms indicate that 
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there is at best no improvement on average in post-merger profits but most likely a 
decline (Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Scherer (2006), Singh (1992), Tichy (2002). 
To the extent that an increase in market power is associated with mergers, the lack of 
such an increase suggests a micro-economic inefficiency in resource utilization, 
certainly not an improvement. 
 
A related set of financial studies – the so-called ‘events studies’ – suggest, however, 
that in US take-overs the acquiring firms suffer a sizeable decline in share prices in 
the period of six months to three years following the merger. The gainers are mainly 
the acquired firms whose share prices may rise by up to 20 per cent on average 
(Jensen, 1988). This poses serious incentive problems as potential acquiring firms 
stand to lose rather than to gain.  Equally importantly, in order to classify these gains 
to the shareholders of acquired firms as being social gains, the analysis has to assume 
that share prices are always efficient in the fundamental valuation sense, which, as 
indicated above, is far from being the case. The rise in the share price of the acquired 
firm may reflect simply the price for control which empire builders are willing to pay 
even to the detriment of their own shareholders (Singh 2000). 
 
In addition to the in-efficiencies of the take-over mechanisms in the real world, in a 
closely related but more general sense, the dominance of stock markets can also result 
in the unhealthy ascendancy of finance over production, and that of financial 
engineering (through the take-over process) over the normal long-term entrepreneurial 
tasks of introducing technical change, reducing costs and improving products.  
 
V. Corporate Finance, the Stock Market and Corporate Governance  
 
A central function of the stock market is to finance corporate growth. The nature of 
finance in turn affects corporate governance. Although the manner in which 
corporations are governed is affected by many factors, the ownership and control of a 
company’s shares are bound to be affected by the manner in which companies are 
financed. For example, if they are primarily financed by creditors, say bank debt, the 
managers’ first concern will be to earn at least the level of profit required to finance 
the debt. If, on the other hand, the principal financing is provided by equity 
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shareholders, managers may earn any rate of profit to finance dividends, which rise 
and fall with the profits, but with the risk of take-over by another company, if share 
prices are too low. 
 
This, of course, also describes the nature of the agency problem in the normal US/UK 
corporation. Managers are supposed to look after the interests of the shareholders, but 
the latter, for various reasons, may not be able to motivate the managers to act in their 
interest  rather than those of the  management itself.  
 
The corporate governance question will be discussed analytically and empirically 
below in two stages. Firstly, we will enquire, how do emerging firms finance their 
growth, i.e., to what extent firms use retained profits or long-term debt or new equity 
to pay for the expansion of their net assets? At the second stage the implications of the 
observed financing patterns for corporate governance will be examined. 
 
Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995), were among the first large scale studies of 
financing corporate growth in emerging markets. These studies arrived at theoretically 
quite unexpected conclusions: Developing country corporations rely far more on 
external that on internal finance, and within external finance, they use equity finance 
to a surprisingly large degree.  
 
It is not surprising in itself that there should be differences between AC and DC 
corporations in relation to how they would meet their financing requirements. 
However, what is observed is totally opposite to what economic analysis would 
predict to be the nature of the differences between the two groups. It may be noted 
that the pattern of finance reported for AC corporations themselves is fully compatible 
with the so-called ‘pecking order’ theory of finance. The latter suggests that firms will 
choose sources of external finance for their investment needs in the following order. 
Firstly, they will rely on internal sources (i.e., retentions) as much as they can; if they 
require more finance, they will borrow from the banks, and will go to the stock 
market only as a last resort.  
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) showed long ago that this pattern of finance can arise from 
the existence of asymmetric information between managers and the world outside the 
 10
corporation. Singh (2003) suggested that these considerations apply with even greater 
force to developing countries. This is because with imperfect capital markets 
developing country corporations may be expected to be obliged to rely largely on self-
financing for their expansion; in addition, they will be reluctant to issue equity capital 
for fear of losing control of the corporation.  
 
Thus, economic analysis predicts that developing country corporations should  depend 
more on internal finance and less on equity than corporation of advanced countries. 
The empirical results are not compatible with this proposition.  
 
How does one explain these theoretically anomalous results on the financing of 
corporate growth observed for the 1980s? Do the 1990s yield similar results? Table 1 
provides information on this subject for firms in 22 DCs and 22 ACs for the period 
1995-2000.  This is a more comprehensive dataset that which was available to 
researchers for the 1980s. Exactly the same methodology is used to measure financing 
of corporate growth for the two periods.  The results show that for the 1990s, the 
pecking order pattern of finance is decisively rejected for both rich and poor 
countries. Also, what stands out is the high recourse to equity finance by developing 
country corporations. (For a full discussion and explanation of these anomalous 
results, termed as the Singh paradox by Dennis Muller see Singh (1995,2003), Gugler 
et al 2003) and Glen and Singh (2005). 
 
Next we take up the implications of these observed patterns of financing corporate 
growth for corporate governance. There are in principle three channels through which 
corporate governance may be affected by the stock market: a) the regulatory 
framework of the stock market itself concerning standards for corporate accounts, 
disclosure of information about major changes in corporate activities, transparency, 
etc., b) the pricing process on the stock market and c) the take-over process.  It is 
worth noting that although AC corporations do not use stock market as much as the 
DC corporations to raise equity capital, the former are paradoxically subject to greater 
discipline of the stock market than are the latter. This is because of the existence of a 
highly active market for corporate control in the U.S. and the U.K. so that even firms 
which never go to the stock market to raise funds, nevertheless, become subject to 
take-over discipline. The nature of discipline imposed by the stock market through the 
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take-over mechanism has been discussed in detail in the last section. It falls far short 
of what is required and indeed creates major distortions of its own particularly for 
developing countries. The stock market pricing process and the take-over mechanism 
are not in general very helpful in improving economic performance in advanced 
countries and there are good reasons to suggest that they are even less likely to do so 
in developing countries. 
 
To illustrate,  consider the Indian case. India, like many other developing countries, 
has  large, potentially predatory conglomerate groups (Singh, 1995). As suggested 
earlier, if there was a market for corporate control these groups could take over 
smaller, more efficient firms and thereby reduce potential competition to the 
detriment of the real economy. Also as noted above, the development of an active 
market for corporate control may encourage managers to “empire-build” not only to 
increase their monopoly power but also to progressively shield themselves from 
takeover by becoming larger. 
 
However, the market for corporate control in developing countries remains 
rudimentary because, shareholdings are not widely dispersed and standards of 
disclosure are not conducive to takeovers.  It is therefore not surprising that hostile 
takeovers are rare in developing countries. However, this situation may change if 
large international MNCs are allowed to engage in takeovers in developing countries.  
Domestic firms, with their limited funds and relatively restricted access to 
international capital markets, would not be able to either compete with or resist the 
MNCs.  
 
There are also other potential factors that could lead financial liberalisation and stock 
markets to have a negative effect on corporate governance.  Financial liberalisation 
establishes a strong link between two potentially volatile markets, the stock market 
and the foreign exchange market.  The Asian crisis of 1997-1998 demonstrated that 
there could be a strong negative feedback relationship between a falling stock market 
and a depreciating currency.  As the stock market declines, investors pull out of the 
market and move their funds into foreign currency.  The depreciating currency, in 
turn, lowers real returns on the stock market which in turn propels the cycle.i  Such a 
collapse in currency and equity values of course, ultimately may encourage “fire-sale-
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type FDI” in the form of takeovers, (suggesting that the expected rate of return 
measured in foreign currency has increased sufficiently due to the steep decline in 
domestic share prices).  This may overturn quite successful corporate governance 
structures and replace them with ones that are less suited.   
 
To sum up, the above considerations together suggest that the greater influence of the 
stock market on developing country corporations is unlikely to improve corporate 
governance in these countries but may on the contrary make it worse.  
 
 
VII. Natural Progression and Econometric Studies 
 
One hypothesis which can certainly be refuted, even by broad brush data is that of 
natural progression. This theory suggests that as countries develop they establish 
stock markets and stock market development is therefore an emblem of economic 
development.  
 
Two kinds of evidence are relevant for assessing the validity of this claim. The first is 
the observation that the economic miracles that occurred in the second half of the 
twentieth century can hardly be ascribed to stock market development. Thus, in post-
World War II Europe – the Italian Miracle, the German miracle, the Austrian miracle 
and in Asia, the justly famous miracles of Korea or Taiwan - did not depend 
conspicuously on the equity or bond markets in these countries. Similarly, the second 
kind of evidence relevant here consists of an examination of comparative growth rates 
over a one hundred year time span. Such an examination reveals that the bank-based 
countries (e.g. Germany and France) have as good if not a better long-term record of 
economic growth as do US and UK. Pagano (1993) notes that the Italian stock market 
was bigger a hundred years ago, than it was until a decade ago. The Italian economy 
evidently grew during these hundred years without any expansion of the stock market.  
 
Turning from the crude historical evidence above to more precise quantitative and 
econometric studies, the pioneering contribution of Goldsmith (1969), on the 
relationship between finance and growth has been followed by econometric exercises. 
An important issue in this research has been the causal question whether finance 
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causes growth or economic growth leads to the development of the financial system. 
Another issue which has received attention is whether the banks and stock markets 
complement each other in causing economic growth or whether they are substitutes. 
 
Levine (1997; 1998) found a positive relationship between banks and economic 
growth, but he did not control for stock market development. Levine and Zervos 
(1998) found that stock market and bank development complement each other in 
assisting economic growth. This finding is confirmed by Beck and Levine (2004) 
which improves upon earlier studies in terms of both methodology and for being able 
to control for many other relevant variables. On the other hand, Atje and Jonanovic 
concluded in an earlier 1993 study that, while stock markets positively affect growth, 
raising it by a huge 2.5 percent per annum, banks had little influence. Sarkar (2009) 
examined the long-term relationship between stock market development and rate of 
investment in India over a fifty-year period from 1950 – 2000. Using time-series 
analysis, he found no long-term relationship between the two variables.  
 
Apart from their mixed results, there are important methodological limitations of 
these econometric exercises. Firstly, as Arestis and Demetriades (1997) noted, most of 
the studies are based on reduced form analysis and are therefore difficult to interpret 
in causal terms. Secondly, they ignore altogether the evidence presented in the earlier 
sections on the observed inefficiencies of the pricing and takeover mechanism on the 
stock markets. These methodological limitations are serious and detract from the 
value of this research. 
 
 
VIII.  Stock Market Regulation and Developing Countries 
 
There was an enormous expansion of DC stock markets in the 1980s and 1990s in the 
wake of financial liberalisation in many of these countries. Compared with the highly 
organised and extensively regulated stock market activity in the US and the UK, most 
DCs do not have such well-functioning markets.  Not only is there inadequate 
government regulation, but private information gathering and disseminating firms are 
also often absent in DCs. These markets continue to suffer from significant regulatory 
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and informational deficits: most DC markets remain ‘immature’ (i.e., riddled with 
insider trading and lack of transparency) and relatively illiquid. Most trading takes 
place in a few blue-chip shares (Singh, 1995; 1997). 
 
DCs have found it difficult to regulate stock markets, as is indicated by frequent 
scams on DC stock markets. This should not be surprising as even highly regulated 
and well-functioning markets, such as those of the US, from time to time experience 
episodes such as those of Enron and WorldCom. Nevertheless, Singh (1998) has 
argued that one regulatory reform, which would be particularly useful for DCs, is to 
stop the emergence of a market for corporate control.  Such a market, as indicated 
above, exacerbates the negative effects of stock markets (e.g. short-termism) from the 
perspective of economic development.  This reform may however involve major 
changes in company law, reducing the role of shareholders and enhancing that of 
stakeholders or the government in takeover situations. DC governments need to find 
cheaper and more efficient ways of changing corporate managements than the lottery 
and the huge expense of the market for corporate control.  They should also 
encourage product market competition to discipline corporations rather than rely on 
the stock market alone for this purpose. 
 
As seen earlier, there are good theoretical reasons as well as evidence for the volatility 
of DC share prices.  Volatility is, however, further accentuated if DCs allow external 
portfolio capital inflows.  This greatly increases the vulnerability of the economy not 
only to international shocks, but also to domestic shocks, substantially magnifying 
their effects. The main reason for this is that capital inflows lead to an interaction 
between two inherently unstable markets – the stock market and the currency market.  
In the event of a large shock (domestic or external) these interactions generate a 
negative feedback that may lead to, or greatly worsen, a financial crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 15
 
 IX. Conclusion 
 
This paper has provided a comprehensive review of the role of the stock markets in 
economic development, taking up topics such as corporate finance, corporate 
governance and technological change. It has surveyed analyses and evidence from 
both developed and developing countries in order to assess how best, if at all, can 
stock markets contribute to economic development.   
 
A main message of the paper is that developing countries with stock markets must 
regulate these so that they do not become a source of instability or short-termism in 
the economy. For this reason, DCs should discourage the emergence of a market for 
corporate control. These countries should find other institutional ways of replacing 
inefficient managements which are reliable and cheap compared with the takeover 
device on the stock market. The latter, as we have seen, carries with it serious dangers 
for economic efficiency and social stability. If Germany and Japan can do without the 
corporate take-over mechanism and live happily, why not India and China? 
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Table 1. Financing of corporate growth in 19 developing countries and 22 advanced 
countries for 1995-2000*  
 
 
AUSTRALIA 58% 32% 11% ARGENTI 46% 16% 38%
AUSTRIA 52% 3% 45% BRAZIL 74% 11% 15%
BELGIUM 56% 6% 38% CHILE 44% 33% 23%
BERMUDA 41% 23% 36% COLOMBI 73% 16% 11%
CANADA 56% 32% 12% CZECH 33% 21% 46%
CAYMAN ISLANDS 90% 8% 2% HONG 44% 20% 35%
DENMARK 72% 6% 23% HUNGAR 28% 1% 71%
FINLAND 53% 26% 22% INDIA 53% 5% 43%
FRANCE 61% 7% 31% INDONESI 110% 12% -23%
GERMANY 62% 5% 33% ISRAEL 54% 6% 40%
GREECE 52% 34% 14% KOREA 27% 48% 25%
IRELAND 76% 5% 18% MALAYSI 40% 18% 42%
ITALY 68% 5% 27% MEXICO 61% 30% 10%
JAPAN 62% 6% 32% PHILIPPIN 34% 17% 49%
NETHERLANDS 65% 9% 26% SOUTH 49% 10% 41%
NORWAY 50% 23% 27% TAIWAN 59% 40% 1%
SINGAPORE 66% 15% 19% THAILAN 74% 11% 15%
1 SPAIN 68% -9% 40% TURKEY 61% 18% 21%
SWEDEN 57% 4% 39% VENEZUE 27% 54% 19%
SWITZERLAND 54% 7% 39%
UNITED KINGDOM 52% 21% 27%
UNITED STATES 47% 21% 32%
Group Average 53% 17% 30% 35% 39% 27%
Global Average 49% 22% 29%
Developed Markets Liabilities Ext F. Int F. Int F.Emerging 
Markets
Liabilities Ext F.
 
 
 
Source: Glen and Singh (2005)  
 
The basic accounting identity in this table is: the total finance for corporate 
growth consists of the growth of liabilities, growth of equity capital (Ext F) and 
the growth of internal finance. 
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